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Abstract 
Purpose: Employee behaviour is a continuous concern owing to the number of information security incidents 
resulting from employee behaviour. The aim of this research is to propose an approach to information security 
culture change management that integrates existing change management approaches, such as the ADKAR model 
of Prosci, and the Information Security Culture Assessment (ISCA) diagnostic instrument (questionnaire), to aid 
in addressing the risk of employee behaviour that could compromise information security. 
Design/methodology/approach: The Information Security Culture Change Management (ISCCM) approach is 
constructed based on literature and the inclusion of the ISCA diagnostic instrument. The ISCA diagnostic 
instrument statements are also presented in this paper. The ISCCM approach using ISCA is illustrated using data 
from an empirical study.  
Findings: The ISCCM approach was found to be useful in defining change management interventions for 
organisations using the data of the ISCA survey. Employees’ perception and acceptance of change to ensure 
information security and the effectiveness of the information security training initiatives improved significantly 
from the as-is survey to the follow-up survey.  
 
Research limitations/implications: The research illustrates the ISCCM approach and shows how it should be 
combined with the ISCA diagnostic instrument. Future research will focus on including a qualitative assessment 
of information security culture to complement the empirical data. 
 
Practical implications: Organisations do not have to rely on or adapt organisational development approaches to 
change their information security culture – they can use the proposed ISCCM approach, which has been 
customised from information security and change management approaches, together with the presented ISCA 
questionnaire, to address information security culture change purposefully. 
 
Originality/value: The proposed ISCCM approach can be applied to complement existing information security 
management approaches through a holistic and structured approach that combines the ADKAR model, Prosci’s 
approach of change management and the ISCA diagnostic instrument. It will enable organisations to focus on 
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transitioning to a positive or desired information security culture that mitigates the risk of the human element in 
the protection of information.  
 
Keywords 
Information security culture, ISCA, ADKAR, change management, transformation, questionnaire, human 
1. Introduction 
The information security culture in an organisation can either contribute to the protection of information or 
introduce risk. An organisation should change its information security culture to a desired state – one where 
employees are educated and equipped to comply with policies; where information security is perceived as 
important; where information is protected throughout its life cycle; and where trust is established with customers 
through the ways their information is processed. 
A planned approach to culture change can enable the workforce to adapt to the change and, ultimately, to change 
their behaviour (Robbins, Judge, Odendaal & Roodt 2016). However, this is not an easy task as the culture must 
be managed continuously to prevent the organisation from spending resources on incorrect or outdated 
assumptions about the organisational culture (Ogbonna 1992), including the information security culture. The 
success of information protection depends on whether employees are convinced through change management to 
behave in a secure manner to instil a strong information security culture (Ashenden & Sasse 2013).   
In an ideal world, one would prefer to deal with change in a planned manner and not as an accidental occurrence. 
This would allow for intentional activities that are goal oriented (Robbins et al. 2016) to implement the 
information security strategy of an organisation. However, organisations are still faced with a lack of mechanisms 
to adapt to change (Ernst & Young 2015). Social media, cloud computing, big data analytics and new legislation 
and regulations present organisations with new challenges regarding the management of threats and vulnerabilities 
from both a technological and a human perspective. While most breaches result from external sources, inside 
employees account for at least 15% of breaches; another 14% of breaches result from errors made by employees, 
according to the Verison Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon 2017). The surveys of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC 2016, 2018) confirm that the human element remains a concern, with current 
(34%) and former (29%) employees representing the largest source of compromise from a people perspective, 
followed by service providers (22%), former service providers (19%) and suppliers (16%). From a technological 
perspective, organisations regard malware and phishing as the top two threats, which relate to the human 
component (Verizon 2017; Ernst & Young 2015). Organisations should aim to use planned mechanisms for 
change to effectively adapt to change and to manage the risk from a human perspective. This also applies to 
change in information security culture. 
The aim of this research is to propose an approach for information security culture change management that 
specifically includes an as-is diagnostic instrument and to illustrate the implementation of such an approach using 
data from an empirical study. Such an approach could contribute to fostering a positive information security 
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culture. In order to achieve the research aims, the Information Security Culture Change Management (ISCCM) 
approach is proposed. This approach combines concepts of Prosci’s ADKAR change management model and 
approach (Hiatt 2006), the change management concepts of Lewin (1951) and the Information Security Culture 
Assessment (ISCA) diagnostic instrument (Da Veiga & Eloff 2010; Da Veiga & Martins 2015a, 2015b, 2017). 
The ADKAR change management model is used as a formal approach to change management in organisations 
and includes five distinct phases, namely awareness (of the need for change), desire (to support and participate in 
the change), knowledge (of how to change), ability (to implement the change) and reinforcement (to sustain the 
change). These phases correlate with the change concepts of Lewin and are used in this research as the foundation 
of the proposed approach that incorporates ISCA as an as-is diagnostic instrument. 
 
Organisations across industries and of various sizes can use the ISCCM approach and related ISCA. Stakeholders 
such as Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Information Security Officers (ISOs) and security management teams 
in organisations can use ISCCM, incorporating ISCA, to complement the organisations’ information security 
programmes. It will provide them with a common and shared understanding of the approach that must be followed 
for information security culture change, how to conduct the as-is assessment using ISCA, and how to use the data 
to define and implement actions to transform the culture. ISCCM complements existing approaches to information 
security management such as the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) (ISACA 
2007) and ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO/IEC 2013) by incorporating the human element and a way in which to assess and 
transform the information security culture. This approach compliments traditional information security 
assessments to include the concept of information security culture using a formally defined approach. The 
outcome of ISCCM can be used together with internal and external audit reports, monitoring reports, self-
assessments, and breach and incident management reports to understand the as-is information security 
environment from a human perspective and to define improvement plans holistically. This could, for example, 
assist management in developing information security training and awareness programmes that are not based on 
outdated assumptions, but on the as-is situation. It will enable management to allocate resources effectively, to 
prioritise high-risk business areas and to monitor the success and impact of interventions through follow-up 
assessments. It will also help management to implement initiatives purposefully from a wider perspective in order 
to create an aspiration for change and to reinforce the changes continuously through a variety of efforts.  Academia 
can use the ISCCM approach as a point of reference for changing information security culture and expand it to 
incorporate other research methods such as qualitative assessments and case studies across different industries. 
Academia can further use and customise the ISCA across countries and industries to aid in understanding the as-
is information security culture across organisations and how to monitor the change through follow-up assessments. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two gives an overview of information security culture 
and section three discusses existing information security culture approaches that incorporate concepts of change 
management. This is followed by a discussion of change management approaches from a social sciences 
perspective, which is used as a point of reference for proposing the ISCCM approach. The ISCCM approach is 
discussed in section five. The research methodology is discussed in section six, after which the ISCCM approach 
is illustrated in section seven, using the empirical data of ISCA. Following the discussion and an outline of the 
limitations, a conclusion is reached in section ten. The ISCA questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
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2. Information security culture 
Information security culture is the “attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, values and knowledge that 
employees/stakeholders use to interact with the organisation's systems and procedures at 
any point in time. The interaction results in acceptable or unacceptable behaviour evident in artefacts 
and creations that become part of the way things are done in the organisation to protect its 
information assets.” (Da Veiga & Eloff 2010:196–197) 
Information security culture is a subculture of organisational culture (Schlienger & Teufel 2003; Van Niekerk & 
Von Solms 2005). It refers to the way things are done in an organisation when employees process information, 
which becomes part of the culture in the organisation (Da Veiga & Martins 2015a). This culture can therefore be 
explained as the shared meaning that the members of an organisation have about the protection of information 
and thus of information security as adapted from the explanation of organisational culture (Martins & Martins 
2016). Their shared meaning will relate to the manner in which they perceive information security requirements 
in the organisation and how they need to comply with those requirements. Employees from different departments, 
job levels, age groups, racial groups or gender groups, each with their own background and diversity traits, will 
have a common perception and thus a similar information security culture (Martins & Martins 2016). This will 
result in subcultures of information security across the organisation such as a departmental culture based on shared 
assumptions or a professional culture based on the qualifications and training of employees (Jex & Britt 2008; Da 
Veiga & Martins 2017). Each group will have a common perception of the information security requirements of 
the organisation, that is to say, what they can and cannot do when processing information (Da Veiga & Martins 
2017). The dominant information security culture is prevalent in the majority of the employees’ perception of 
upholding the core information security characteristics of the organisation. This dominant information security 
culture can influence employee behaviour (Martins & Martins 2016) and direct their actions in line with 
information security policies and expected behaviour.  
The information security culture in an organisation develops as a result of the day-to-day behaviour that is 
exhibited by employees and is visible in artefacts, espoused values and shared tacit assumptions (Schein 1985, 
2006). On an artefact level, the expected behaviour is visible in the form of tangible aspects such as an information 
security policy, information security training, a reporting line for security incidents, regular self-assessments in 
departments and the technology used by an organisation (Schein 1985; Schlienger & Teufel 2003; Da Veiga & 
Eloff 2010). The artefact level is underpinned by the values of an organisation, such as customer service or 
honesty. The shared tacit assumptions, as formed by beliefs and values, relate to how and why employees assume 
information should be protected when they process it (Van Niekerk & Von Solms 2006; Da Veiga & Eloff 2010). 
The espoused values form over time and relate to what employees believe should be done to protect information 
such as not sharing confidential information with third parties to preserve confidentiality and privacy values (Van 
Niekerk & Von Solms 2006; Da Veiga & Martins 2015b).  
 
A strong or positive information security culture is one where information is protected throughout its life cycle at 
all points where employees interact with it in some way and where employees have a common perception towards 
the protection of information in line with the information security policy of the organisation. The interaction of 
employees with information should be in compliance with the organisation’s information security policies and 
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regulatory requirements. However, the behaviour of internal employees continues to be a concern owing to the 
number of incidents related to employees in the form or errors, negligence or malicious intentions (Sherif, Furnell 
& Clarke 2015; AlHogail 2015). Organisations therefore require assistance in directing or changing their 
information security culture to the desired culture. 
 
3. Existing approaches where change management was applied in the context of information security 
culture 
Detert, Schroeder and Mauriel (2000) identify change management as one of the dimensions of organisational 
culture, stating that “improvement cannot come without change”. Ruighaver, Maynard and Chang (2007) apply 
the model proposed by Detert et al. (2000) to an organisation’s information security culture and incorporate a 
focus on change. Change management is required in an organisation to improve the compliance of employees 
with information security polices, the manner in which information is protected and employee awareness, and 
ultimately to improve the information security culture in the organisation. AlHogail (2015) argues that changing 
the information security culture in an organisation requires input from management and will result in a huge effort 
to redirect employees from what they are currently doing wrong.  
 
Research on efforts to redirect employee behaviour in respect of an information security culture ranges from the 
work that Lewin initiated in 1951 (Ngo, Zhou & Warren 2005; Van Niekerk & Von Solms 2005) to research on 
the use of change agents (Ashenden & Sasse 2013), change management actions (AlHogail 2015), and the 
management of different types of changes relating to information technology (Dhillon, Syed & Pedron 2016). The 
most prominent researchers who have considered the concept of change management in an information security 
culture are listed in the table in Appendix 1. None of the existing approaches to applying change management or 
transformational perspectives to an information security culture follow a comprehensive and structured change 
management approach like ADKAR, neither do they include processes with concrete steps that organisations can 
apply to redirect and transform their information security culture to a desired state. Recent research on the 
information security culture in organisations (Connolly, Lang, Gathegi & Tygar 2017; Parsons, Calic, Pattinson, 
Butavicius, McCormac & Zwaans 2017; Dhillon, Syed & Pedron 2016) also does not include the application of 
change management approaches in organisations’ information security culture that includes an as-is diagnostic 
instrument that can be used to collect reliable and valid data on which to base the change management decisions. 
 
There are various change management approaches other than Lewin’s work that can be considered when 
developing a comprehensive change management approach for an information security culture. Examples of these 
approaches include the Congruence Model (Nadler & Tushman 1980), Kotter’s Change Model (Kotter 1996, 
2006), the Theory of Constraints (TOC) (Patrick 2001; Goldratt 1999; Kazmi & Naarananoja 2014), the Kaizen 
Model (Plan – Do – Check – Act) (Plunkett & Attner 1994) and Prosci’s ADKAR Model and approach (Hiatt 
2006). The next section provides an overview of these existing change management models and approaches in 
order to indicate their positive contributions that serve as the building blocks for an information security culture 
change management approach. 
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4. An overview of change management models and approaches  
Organisational culture can be understood as “the lens through which employees of an organisation learn to 
interpret the environment” (Jex & Britt 2008). It will guide employees’ behaviour, for instance, to ensure that all 
access requests are approved and documented, or that all hand-held devices are protected with a password. An 
organisational culture that has developed over time is difficult to change, mainly because the assumptions of 
employees might need to change (Jex & Britt 2008). Lewin (1947) introduced the concept of planned change 
(Boje, Burnes & Hassard 2012). He introduced a three-step approach called “theories of change” (Leban & Stone 
2008), where the “unfreezing” step is used to unfreeze existing behaviour through demonstration or clarification 
of the problem. This is followed by creating a desire to change through driving forces and thus to “move or 
change” to the desired behaviour, which must be “frozen” again. The Information security awareness report 
published by the Information Security Forum (ISF 2002) lists a number of driving forces and resisting forces that 
can play a role in this process. The ISF explains the process by using the example of a new policy that requires 
employees to keep their ID cards with them to enter and exit various areas in a building. Such a rule might be 
resisted by employees who object to it. By introducing positive driving forces such as canteen discounts for 
cardholders, employees might realise that they will benefit from adhering to the policy and start to move towards 
the desired behaviour. This is an effective approach in the context of information security where employees 
constantly need to adapt to technological changes and where safe habits must be cultivated. Employees’ resistance, 
which is underlined by the organisational culture, needs to be changed to positive acceptance of the change 
through the use of planned driving forces that are proactively implemented by management (ISF 2002). 
In the wake of Lewin’s (1951) approach, a number of change management models or approaches have been 
developed. Nadler and Tushman’s (1980) Congruence Model incorporates a focus on organisational performance 
and the role that leadership plays in the process. They argue that organisations are similar to systems that must be 
in congruence to ensure optimal performance. In support of the Congruence Model, Nadler and Tushman (1980) 
propose a process that comprises five stages, namely diagnosis (stage 1), preparation (stage 2), implementing 
change (stage 3), consolidating change (stage 4) and sustaining change (stage 5) (Leban & Stone 2008). Although 
their model presents a structured approach, it can involve a long and costly process to implement (Basu 2018). 
The important work by Kotter (1996, 2006) outlines an eight-stage change management model that focuses on the 
processes to follow in institutionalising change: 
 establishing a greater sense of urgency  
 forming a guiding coalition  
 developing a transformational vision  
 communicating the transformational vision  
 empowering employees to action  
 creating short-term wins 
 consolidating improvements and producing more change 
 institutionalising new approaches in the culture (Kotter 2006; Leban & Stone 2008).  
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Kotter’s (2006) model is designed for a strategic view and is one of the most widely-used models, even though it 
does not have a tactical focus (Leban & Stone 2008). A critique of Kotter’s model is the lack of integration of 
project management (Kazmi & Naarananoja 2014).  
 
Other models for change management have emerged, for example, Goldratt’s (1999) Theory of Constraints (TOC) 
(Kazmi & Naarananoja 2014) and the Kaizen Model (Plan – Do – Check  – Act) (Plunkett & Attner 1994). 
Arguments against these models are that they are implemented over longer periods and have a longer timeframe 
of impact (Kazmi & Naarananoja 2014). This critique needs to be viewed in the light of Kotter’s work which 
emphasises that change takes a considerable amount of time, especially when one aims to embed it in the culture 
of an organisation (Kotter 2006). Other change management models to take note of are those by Kanter, Stein and 
Jick (1992) and Luecke (2003). These two models incorporate an emphasis on leadership and identifying the need 
for change (Abdulkadhim, Bahari, Bakri & Ismail 2015). Todnem (2005) critically reviewed change management 
models in 2005. He did a comprehensive comparison of Kanter, Kotter and Luecke’s work as the emerging 
models, with contrasting views from researchers on the models. Since then new perspectives and models on 
managing change have emerged. The website of Change Activation lists at least 16 different change management 
models or approaches for which toolkits are available (Change Activation 2018). Three of the approaches relate 
to the work of Prosci, which had not yet been developed when Todnem did his review on change management.  
 
The ADKAR Model which was developed by Prosci was published in the form of a textbook in 2006 (Hiatt 2006). 
In conjunction with the model, Prosci developed a change management approach consisting of three phases, 
namely preparing for change, managing the change and post-intervention. These three phases correspond to 
Lewin’s (1951) theory, but additional, more detailed steps are embedded in each phase. During phase 1, the change 
management strategy is defined, the team is prepared and the sponsorship model is developed. In phase 2, the 
change is managed through management and implementation plans. The ADKAR Model, which serves as a goal-
oriented change management model that can be applied in a personal or organisational context, is embedded in 
this phase. It focuses on the five key areas which make up the acronym ADKAR, namely awareness (of the need 
for change), desire (to support and participate in the change), knowledge (of how to change), ability (to implement 
the change) and reinforcement (to sustain the change). The last phase concentrates on post-intervention. In this 
phase, feedback is collected and analysed, gaps are diagnosed and corrective actions are implemented.  
 
The current state, which must be unfrozen according to Lewin’s theory (1951), corresponds to Prosci’s awareness 
and desire phases. The knowledge and awareness phases correspond to a transition to “move or change”, as Lewin 
refers to it. The reinforcement phase aids in refreezing behaviour. These steps are easy to convert to project 
management plans and focus strongly on employees and changing their behaviour. The approach can be applied 
to a wide variety of changes, including an information security culture change. From an organisational change 
perspective, Prosci (2013) finds that eight out of ten projects follow a structured approach to change management 
which helps them with planned interventions to derive sustainable changes in behaviour. It is therefore necessary, 
from an information security perspective, to follow a structured approach to changing an information security 
culture in order to minimise the risk that human behaviour (i.e. error or negligence) could pose to the protection 
of information.  
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The ADKAR model can be used effectively to establish whether employees are ready to change. The model can 
also be used to define corresponding actions plans. Kazmi and Naarananoja (2014) used the ADKAR model as 
the preferred model in their research on a healthcare project in Finland. They found it effective in identifying 
problem areas and they adapted it accordingly to implement change effectively and efficiently. The ADKAR 
model has also been implemented successfully in other scenarios, for example changes to governance structures 
in a Texas hospital environment (Sheperd, Harris, Chung & Himes 2014) and an analysis of the change 
management competencies of school heads in Pakistan (Kiani & Shah 2014). 
 
Aspects missing from the Prosci approach and model are how change should be understood from an information 
security culture perspective, what type of change is required and which information must be gathered prior to the 
first phase (preparing for change). Information about all these aspects is required to define the strategy, to 
determine who needs to be involved in the change, to understand the urgency of the change and to develop the 
aspects needed to address the five areas of ADKAR. The concept of organisational development (OD) can be 
integrated to address this limitation since it follows an action research design in which a cycle of assessments and 
evaluations is used to solve a problem (Boje et al. 2012; Berry & Houston 1993; Coghlan & Brydon-Miller 2014).  
It can be applied to understand the as-is environment from an information security culture perspective and to 
evaluate the effects of the change by repeating the diagnosis, comparing the results to monitor improvement, and 
managing and directing the change consistently. This corresponds with the Kaizen Model approach, where an 
assessment is also conducted as part of the checking phase to ensure continuous improvement. 
  
The next section outlines the proposed information security culture change approach in the light of the above 
discussion.   
5. Information security culture change management (ISCCM) approach 
A change management approach to an information security culture should be grounded in existing change 
management models or approaches since these models have already been used with success in the social sciences. 
It is furthermore critical to understand the existing information security culture in an organisation before 
introducing any changes. Therefore, an assessment must be conducted to understand the as-is environment and to 
determine which behaviours need to change. Once these are understood, it is important to use planned 
interventions to transform the culture. This requires concrete actions that the organisation can implement to drive 
the change. Finally, after the interventions, the organisation should reassess whether the actions have had the 
desired impact and resulted in the desired outcome.  
The information security culture change management approach is constructed by incorporating the following 
aspects from the existing change management approaches discussed in section 3: 
- Lewin’s theory of “freezing”, “moving” and “refreezing” behaviour (which corresponds to ADKAR) 
- the ADKAR model, so that the practical implementation of Lewin’s theory can be attended to through 
detailed tactical and operational activities 
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- Prosci’s approach of change management, so that the change management phases can be structured in an 
organisational change management programme 
- the OD process, so that an as-is assessment can be conducted to identify gaps, and so that the rationale for 
change that can feed into the change management strategy can be defined and the change can be monitored 
continuously to direct and sustain it 
The information security culture change management approach, or ISCCM, is set out in figure 1. It is a holistic 
approach that focuses on the transition to a positive or desired information security culture in an organisation in 
order to aid in mitigating the risks posed by the human element in the protection of information. The ISCCM 
consists of four distinct phases that are implemented on a cyclical basis. Each phase comprises a number of 
activities as explained below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Information security culture change management (ISCCM) approach  
5.1 As-is assessment (AI): Before change management activities are embarked on in an organisation, it is 
essential to conduct an assessment to establish the current situation (Berry & Houston 1993; Byars & Rue 1997; 
Herold 2011). During this phase, the information security culture level is assessed. This helps the organisation to 
determine the threats to the information security culture and to identify the strengths in the culture from which to 
leverage efforts. In essence, the as-is information security culture assessment gives the organisation an indication 
of the institutionalisation of the information security policy and related requirements. The assessment presents the 
organisation with a view of what employees perceive and whether it is acceptable or requires intervention. In 
summary, the as-is assessment presents the organisation with a snapshot of where it is in order to help it determine 
where it should be. 
5.1.1 ISCA diagnostic instrument 
The Information Security Culture Assessment (ISCA) is used as the key diagnostic instrument (questionnaire) in 
the as-is assessment (Da Veiga & Martins 2015). Other information security culture diagnostic instruments such 
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as the diagnostic instruments proposed by AlHogail (2015) and Schlienger and Teufel (2003, 2005), which are 
offered in a commercial context (Tree Solution 2018), are also available to measure information security culture. 
These instruments all focus on the information security culture in an organisation, but their perspectives differ. 
The diagnostic instrument of Da Veiga and Martins (2015) is based on a theoretical model of information security 
culture (Da Veiga & Eloff 2010), has been customised for the industry, and has been validated through statistical 
methods with a reliability score of between 0.764 and 0.877 (Da Veiga & Martins 2015b). It provides valid and 
reliable results over time to facilitate changes in employee attitude and related behaviour, and to inculcate a 
positive information security culture. Appendix 2 includes the statements of the ISCA diagnostic instrument as 
customised for the organisation in this study.  
 
The ISCA is conducted in the form of an electronic survey that is distributed to all employees in the organisation 
to complete. Focus groups are also used to confirm the results of the assessment. Empirical data is derived from 
the ISCA to understand the level of information security culture in the organisation, the required content of 
training and awareness programmes, and the stakeholders that need to be prioritised for interventions based on 
their perceptions. 
 
The ISCA questionnaire consists of three sections: 
-  A section with information security background questions that are mainly answered using a yes/no scale. 
This section is developed with the organisation participating in the study to ask questions about the existing 
policies and awareness activities for background purposes.  
-  The second section comprises ten dimensions with a total of 55 statements that measure the information 
security culture on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, unsure, agree, strongly agree). The 
ten information security culture dimensions were reduced to six dimensions with 49 statements following 
the factor and item analysis (Da Veiga & Martins 2015b). 
-  A biographical section is included. Participants are required to answer demographical questions to segment 
the data in employee groups such as office location, generation group, gender, business unit and/or job level. 
 
5.1.2 Overall information security culture mean 
The means for the ten dimensions and for the various demographical groups are determined. The lowest and 
highest items are identified per demographical group to identify focus areas for change management activities. 
When the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test reveals that specific biographical groups are significantly more 
negative than the other groups, these groups are regarded as high-risk groups. Action plans for these groups can 
be prioritised as part of the ISCCM approach. Further statistical analysis is conducted to identify recommendations 
for improvement which can be included in the change management strategy.  
To supplement the ISCA results and draw correlations, other metrics such as monitoring, compliance audits, 
internal and/or external audits, incident management data and risk assessment outcomes can be used to obtain a 
holistic view of information security implementation and controls in the organisation. Owing to the statistical 
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validity and reliability of the ISCA diagnostic instrument, it was selected for inclusion in the ISCCM to understand 
the as-is information security culture and to monitor the change over time. 
 
5.2 Preparing for the change (PC) 
The as-is diagnosis aids in defining the need for change. The information security culture change objectives are 
derived from the outcomes of ISCA and feed into the information security culture change management strategy. 
The strategy can vary depending on the nature of the outcome of the as-is assessment. This implies that the strategy 
might involve minimal intervention in some cases and comprehensive interventions in other cases to protect the 
organisational data and to create a competitive advantage while mitigating the risks. The strategy could address 
aspects such as the improvement of the information security culture and compliance as identified in the ISCA 
data.  
 
Since culture change takes many years, the strategy should also span a number of years and incorporate continuous 
assessment. Rossouw and Van Vuuren (2013) refer to four broad strategies for the management of ethical culture, 
namely “reactive, compliance, integrity and totally aligned” strategies. In the context of the information security 
culture in an organisation, a reactive strategy is prevalent when management aims to address information security 
after breaches and incidents have occurred without proactive intervention such as educating and training 
employees. A compliance strategy focuses on aligning employee behaviour with the information security policies, 
whereas an integrity strategy focuses on the strategic advantage of a strong information security culture and not 
only on minimising incidents. The ultimate strategy to aim for is the totally aligned strategy, which means that 
the information security culture is embedded in the organisation’s strategy and vision, and positive behaviour is 
rewarded as part of the culture. 
 
Once the strategy has been defined, the resources required for the project are identified. Resources could include 
internal teams, external consultants and/or third parties. A change management team is established with key 
stakeholders from across the business who can assist in rolling out the implementation and act as change agents. 
 
Lastly, the information security culture sponsorship model is defined to identify the leaders in the organisation 
and the management roles that will be involved in supporting and sponsoring change management initiatives. 
Leaders play an important role in directing change and behaviour (Jex & Britt 2008). Similarly, top management 
plays a role in the development of the culture in an organisation (Martins & Martins 2016). If change in culture is 
required, top management must become involved in and support the change, and lead by example to promote 
employee buy-in. 
 
5.3 Managing the change (MC) 
Information security culture change management plans are developed based on the strategy and the findings of 
the as-is diagnosis using the ISCA diagnostic instrument. The plans are developed according to the ADKAR 
phases to implement driving forces and to change behaviour to the desired state when the action plans are 
implemented. Although ADKAR focuses on areas that must be developed or changed, it is essential to approach 
the activities from a project management perspective. This means that roles must be allocated, deadlines defined 
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and progress monitored during the development and implementation phases. Approaches such as Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK), Gantt charts or work breakdown structures can be followed 
(Whitman & Mattord 2017). 
 
The ISCA data is specifically used in the awareness and knowledge phases of ADKAR. In the awareness phase 
the need for change becomes evident when the ISCA dimensions and/or statements with the most negative scores 
on the mean are considered. Awareness can then be created about the concepts identified. If, for example, 
employees feel that the information security policy is too difficult to understand, management can be made aware 
that there is a need to change or update the information security policy to make it more understandable. During 
the knowledge phase, developmental dimensions and statements identified in the ISCA serve as input to define 
the topics that should be included in the creation of awareness. In this way, specific topics can be prioritised and 
targeted for specific demographic groups identified in the data. For example, the background questions in the 
ISCA are used to determine if employees have read the information security policy and the information security 
culture question is used to determine if the policy is understandable.  
 
A desire to participate in and support the change and the ability to implement the change are not necessarily 
dependent on the ISCA data, but on the involvement and buy-in of management, project management and the 
available resources in the organisation. The ISCA data can be used as motivation to create a desire for change and 
to define the acceptable mean score for the ISCA dimensions.  
 
5.4. Reinforcing the change (RC) 
 
As part of the feedback process, the change management team needs to establish whether employee behaviour has 
indeed changed. This can be done by defining measurement criteria for desired outcomes. Similarly, audits, 
quality control or compliance testing can be used to confirm whether all access to a system has been authorised, 
for example. Technology can be used to determine how many hours employees spend on the internet and whether 
employees back up information to the designated file servers. Where gaps are identified, the message can be 
reinforced, positive behaviour can be rewarded and incorrect behaviour can be followed up.  
 
A follow-up ISCA is conducted to establish whether the implemented change management actions have had a 
positive impact on the information security culture. A follow-up ISCA also enables the organisation to determine 
whether the change management activities have been successful from a culture perspective and whether other 
developmental areas have arisen over time. Data from a follow-up ISCA survey for a specific organisation 
facilitates the successful monitoring of the culture change over a period of time. Data from the as-is assessment 
and the follow-up ISCA is compared to identify trends and improvements (or areas where there has been a 
decline). Any dimensions or statements that have not improved since the as-is assessment can be regarded as gaps, 
for which corrective actions are defined and implemented. The messages and changes are reinforced based on the 
last phase of ADKAR through various activities or repetition such as monthly e-mails, online training, change 
agents and face-to-face discussions.  
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The research methodology section sets out the application of the ISCCM approach with ISCA in an organisation 
to illustrate its implementation.  
6. Research methodology 
6.1 Research design 
The research was done in the form of a quantitative study in an organisation. The ISCCM is illustrated using data 
from an ISCA that was conducted at two intervals in a financial organisation. The organisation conducted the 
information security culture assessment to monitor the success of its information security programme, to identify 
where to focus training and awareness initiatives and, ultimately, to determine what to change in order to instil a 
positive information security culture.  
 
6.2 The organisation 
The empirical study was conducted in the offices of the organisation and which are located in 12 countries. The 
Group Information Security Officer (GISO) of the organisation manages information security with a team of 
Country Information Security Officers (CISOs) and Business Unit Information Security Officers (BISOs). 
Information security is managed via a formal programme in the organisation through regular awareness and 
training initiatives. Offices across all the countries have to adhere to the group’s information security policies and 
procedures. This research study was conducted as part of an information security culture assessment to monitor 
changes in the organisation’s information security culture after the implementation of corrective actions. 
 
6.3 Responses 
The census sampling method (Cooper & Schindler 2003:179) was used for the empirical study and all employees 
in the organisation were included in the survey invite. The survey link was e-mailed by the organisation to all its 
employees at all job levels in all its offices in the different countries. A competition was included in the survey. 
To enter the competition, employees had to supply their e-mail address when they submitted the survey. They 
then stood a chance of winning one of a number of iPads. To protect the employees’ privacy and to maintain 
confidentiality, e-mail addresses were separated from survey responses and all duplications were removed. 
The survey was conducted at two intervals with a timeframe of three years in between. At the time of the first 
survey, the organisation employed +/- 7 000 employees, of whom 2 320 responded to the survey. During the 
follow-up survey, the organisation employed +/- 8 000 employees, of whom 2 159 participated in the survey. 
Since employees participated on a voluntary basis, the method proposed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) was 
applied to determine the minimum number of responses required for a 95% confidence level. For the as-is survey, 
a total of 364 responses was required and for the follow-up survey, a total of 367 responses was required, 
comprising a 33% response rate for the as-is survey and a 26% response rate for the follow-up survey. The 
difference in the response rates can be attributed to the voluntary nature of the survey. For both surveys, an 
adequate number of responses was received for the overall data to be generalised to the overall population at a 
95% confidence level. 
SurveyTracker (Scantron 2018) and IBM SPSS Statistics Version 22.0 (IBM 2011) were used to conduct the 
statistical analysis. The data was analysed, and the means, the frequencies and the frequency distribution were 
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determined for the overall data and biographical segmentation. ANOVA and t-tests were used to determine the 
significant differences between the biographical groups in order to prioritise change management initiatives. 
Biographical groups with less than five responses were not included in the analysis in order to protect the 
respondents’ confidentiality.  
7.  Application of the ISCCM approach using ISCA 
Data from the as-is survey was used to define change interventions following the ISCCM approach. The as-is data 
was compared with the follow-up data to establish whether the organisation had made progress with the 
development of the desired information security culture. The participating organisation implemented 
comprehensive action plans following the as-is survey based on the ISCA findings.  
The discussion below outlines how the ISCCM was applied in the context of the participating organisation. 
7.1 As-is assessment (IA) 
The data of the as-is survey was used to obtain an understanding of the as-is information security culture of the 
organisation. The information security culture means for half of the dimensions were below 4.00. The cut-off for 
improvement, as agreed with management, was 4.00 for the mean (Da Veiga & Martins 2015). Therefore, the 
information security culture means of five of the dimensions could be improved through specific interventions. 
The privacy perception (3.56), training and awareness (3.02), information security leadership (3.88), trust (3.88) 
and information security programme (3.96) dimensions had the lowest mean scores and were thus identified as 
the priority dimensions to focus on (see table 1).  
Table 1: Information security culture dimension means and percentage agree scores for the as-is and follow-up 
surveys 
 
Information security culture dimensions As-is 
survey 
means 
% 
agree 
Follow-up 
survey 
means 
% 
agree 
Improvement 
1. Change management 4.09 84.7% 4.14 86.1% Yes 
2. Information asset management 4.22 88.9% 4.30 91.2% Yes 
3. Information security leadership 3.88 76.1% 4.03 82.1% Yes 
4. Information security management 4.14 90.6% 3.96 80.1% No 
5. Information security policies 4.08 80.5% 4.15 82.5% Yes 
6. Information security programme 3.96 76.8% 4.05 80.5% Yes 
7. Trust 3.88 74.8% 3.95 76.8% Yes 
8. User management 4.08 83.4% 4.14 85.8% Yes 
9. Training and awareness 3.02 39.9% 3.08 43.0% Yes 
10. Privacy perception 3.56 61.5% 3.67 65.4% Yes 
 
The most negative statements in the prioritised dimensions were identified to develop specific interventions. Table 
2 provides an extract of some of the negative statements in these dimensions and the corresponding mean and 
percentage agree scores for both surveys. The offices with the lowest mean scores for each statement are also 
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included in table 2. These can be regarded as high-risk offices that must be prioritised for the implementation of 
action plans. 
Table 2: The most negative IS culture statements and improved scores  
Most negative culture 
statements – as-is 
survey 
Dimension 
Mean % agree 
Lowest office % agree – based on as-
is survey  
As-is 
survey 
Follow-
up 
survey 
As-is 
survey 
Follow-
up 
survey 
As-is survey 
Follow-up 
survey 
21. I believe X’s 
employees adhere to the 
information security 
policy. 
Information 
security 
leadership 
3.66 3.81 ** 65.4% 72.8% SA – PE 38.1% 
SA – Jhb 52.5% 
Australia – 62.9% 
SA – PE 80% 
SA – Jhb 63.7% 
Australia – 74.7% 
20. My division clearly 
outlines what is 
expected of me with 
regard to information 
security. 
Information 
security 
leadership 
 
3.66 
 
3.82 ** 
 
68.2% 
 
73.5% 
Australia – 52.3% 
UK – Abingdon – 
56.7% 
SA – Jhb – 59.2% 
Australia – 68.3% 
UK – Abingdon – 
* 
SA – Jhb – 68.2% 
38. I believe that third 
parties who have access 
to confidential 
information preserve its 
confidentiality. 
Trust 
 
3.38 
 
3.50 ** 
 
44.8% 
 
49.7% 
SA – PE 28.6% 
Switzerland – 
Zurich 33.3% 
SA – Pretoria 
36.4% 
SA – PE 36% 
Switzerland – 
Zurich 66.7% 
SA – Pretoria 
40.7% 
33. I believe my 
division commits 
enough people to 
information security. 
Information 
security 
programme 
 
3.60 
 
3.77 ** 
 
56.5% 
 
64.9% 
SA – PE 42.9% 
UK – Abingdon 
43.3% 
SA – Jhb 47.8% 
SA – PE 64% 
UK – Abingdon * 
SA – Jhb 58.1% 
34. I believe my 
division commits 
enough money to 
information security. 
Information 
security 
programme 
 
3.59 
 
3.70 ** 
 
53.6% 
 
59.1% 
SA – PE 38.1%  
Switzerland – 
Zurich 38.9% 
SA – Jhb 44.5% 
SA – PE 68% 
Switzerland – 
Zurich 73.3% 
SA – Jhb 56.1% 
32. I believe my 
division commits 
enough time to 
information security. 
Information 
security 
programme 
 
3.66 
 
3.82 ** 
 
63.9% 
 
72.2% 
SA – PE 57.1% 
SA – Cape Town 
58.5% 
Australia 59.0% 
SA – PE 80% 
SA – Cape Town 
71.0% 
Australia 75.3% 
  Note: *UK – Abingdon office not included in follow-up survey 
            ** Significant difference, indicating an improvement, between as-is and follow-up survey as per t-test 
             Sig. (2-tailed) value was 0.000 for the means (significant if p< 0.05) (Howell 1995) 
 
The offices with the lowest overall mean score in the as-is survey were UK – Abingdon (3.92), Australia (3.93) 
and SA – Jhb (3.96). The gaps in the information security knowledge section related to only 61.6% (lowest scored 
offices: SA – Pretoria 45.5%; SA – Durban 49.4%; UK – Abingdon 50%) of employees, who indicated that they 
had read the information security policy. Only 67.8% (lowest scored offices: Australia 51.1%; UK – Abingdon 
51.7%; UK –Manchester 62.5%) knew where to get a copy of the information security policy. Furthermore, only 
38.7% of employees knew who their business unit security officer was, while 48.2% knew who the group 
information security officer was. The Zurich office (55.6%) and the Ireland office’s (40.8%) employees knew of 
more information security breaches compared to, for example, SA – Durban, with only 2.6%, and Australia, with 
3.5%. No significant differences were found between the job levels and, as such, the interventions were not 
tailored to job levels, but rather to office locations where significant differences were identified. 
 
The organisation’s employees had a very positive view of change management. Ninety-five per cent of employees 
indicated that they accepted that some inconvenience was necessary to secure important information. An 
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additional 95.1% indicated that they were prepared to change their working practices in order to ensure the security 
of information assets, while 80.1% felt that their division positively accepted changes in their working practices 
in order to ensure the security of information assets. These aspects are positive building blocks that can be used 
to leverage the change management strategy and to introduce change to employees. Employees indicated that their 
preferences for receiving information security messages were via e-mail (86.3%), presentations (26.5%) and the 
intranet (15.5%). These methods can be incorporated in the change management plan. 
 
7.2 Preparing for change (PC) 
 
In preparation for change, a broad strategy was formulated to improve the information security culture in the 
organisation. The strategic initiative of the organisation was defined as focusing on improving information 
security leadership to create a trusting environment where the information security programme could function 
effectively and efficiently to aid in fostering a strong information security culture. Over time, management 
envisaged a culture in which the overall mean and the individual dimension means of the information security 
culture would be above 4.00, aiming for a totally aligned information security culture. From a behavioural 
perspective, management envisaged a culture where employees would comply with information security policies 
and understand what was expected of them to protect information at all times. A change management team 
consisting of the GISO and related CISOs and BISOs was established. The organisation included external 
consultants as part of the team to assist in developing the outputs of the defined action plans and initiatives. The 
GISO acted as the project sponsor and coordinated the project.  
 
7.3 Managing the change (MC) 
 
This section outlines how the results of the ISCA were used to compile a change management plan using ADKAR 
in the MC phase. The first ISCA served as the as-is assessment to create awareness and a desire to change as part 
of the current phase relating to the awareness and desire phases of ADKAR. The action plans defined on the basis 
of the as-is data were implemented, leading to the transition phase, which, in turn, map to the knowledge and 
ability phases of ADKAR. The follow-up ISCA allowed for a comparison between the data to establish whether 
there was improvement or change, resembling the reinforcing phase of ADKAR. The ISCA data was used as 
follows in the MC phase: 
 
Awareness: In the awareness phase of the ADKAR model, the ISCA data is used to motivate why change is 
necessary. In the participating organisation, the researchers participated in presenting the findings to the project 
team and a CISO presented the findings to the various stakeholder groups. During the presentation, the findings, 
the impact of a negative culture, and breaches and incidents that further justified why change was necessary were 
discussed. An overview of the key findings was communicated to employees of the organisation. The top ten 
statements and bottom ten statements needed to be prioritised since they would guide the priority of action plans. 
Priority offices, as identified in the demographical groups, also needed to be communicated to initiate and focus 
on  interventions with the most critical groups. In the case of the participating organisation, the Abingdon, 
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Australia and Johannesburg offices scored the lowest and were therefore prioritised in terms of creating awareness 
and implementing focused action plans.  
 
Desire to change: In the desire-to-change phase of ADKAR, the desired outcome is depicted. In the case of the 
participating organisation, the desired outcome was to achieve improved mean scores for the information security 
culture dimensions. A key action that can support this is to conduct focus groups to obtain the commitment and 
buy-in of management. As part of the focus groups, the desire for change can be created by discussing the positive 
impact of leadership and governance in information security. Furthermore, competitions can be considered, for 
example the nomination of role models for information security or prizes for departments with zero information 
security incidents per month. In addition, certain information security compliance aspects can be incorporated in 
employee performance appraisals. In the participating organisation, a number of focus groups were conducted and 
meetings were held with key stakeholders to aid in creating a desire for change. 
 
Knowledge: During the knowledge (transition) phase, employees are provided with the knowledge required to 
change. The ISCA data is used to define the knowledge areas or topics to create awareness or training. In the 
case study, some of the priority topics related to policy compliance (statement 21), expectations (statement 20), 
third parties (statement 38), commitment (statements 32, 33 and 34) and the location of the information security 
policy (knowledge section). Awareness and training material was created for the priority topics, to be 
disseminated using the preferred methods of communication. The following specific methods were implemented 
by the participating organisation: monthly awareness e-mails, group presentations, annual induction training 
presentations, a brochure with a summary of information security policy requirements to mail to all, and the 
creation of an information security portal on the intranet with information security policies, updates and 
messages.  
 
Priority audiences can be identified, and tailored awareness or training initiatives can be developed on the basis 
of the developmental aspects identified for those audiences. The following aspects were defined for the 
participating organisation: 
- Creating awareness regarding third-party compliance with data protection policies among internal staff and 
third parties, prioritising SA – PE, Switzerland – Zurich and SA – Pretoria. 
- Communicating the location of the information security policy and procedures, with a focus on Australia, 
UK – Abingdon and UK – Manchester. 
- Communicating the commitment from the organisation to invest in people, time and money to implement 
information security requirements, specifically in relation to SA – PE/Jhb/CT, UK – Abingdon, 
Switzerland – Zurich and Australia. 
- Summarising the requirements of the information security policy and creating awareness about it, focusing 
on Australia, UK – Abingdon and SA – Jhb. 
- Creating awareness about the requirements for compliance and the consequences of non-compliance among 
all staff. 
- Communicating who the information security officers are in the group and in the business units to all 
employees. 
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Ability to change: To enable the organisation to change, CISOs and BISOs can be trained, as was done at the 
participating organisation. In addition, change agents can be appointed in high-risk offices to assist with the 
identified interventions, unless the CISOs and BISOs fulfil this role as in the participating organisation. 
Additional information security officers can also be appointed in large offices such as the UK – London and the 
SA – Jhb offices. External consultants can be used to assist with the roll-out of the action plans. The ability to 
change can be strengthened though activities such as awareness sessions, spot checks, brown bag sessions and 
self-assessments in the business units to determine compliance with information security policies. The 
participating organisation specifically focused on training the CISOs and BISOs, as well as awareness sessions 
and self-assessments. 
 
7.4 Reinforcing the change (RC) 
 
The changes that are implemented in the MC phase are reinforced in the RC phase through a follow-up assessment 
of the ISCA survey to monitor the changes and to benchmark the results. In the case study, nine of the ten 
information security culture dimensions improved, as indicated in table 1. The mean of the information security 
management dimension was lower, which could be attributed to the structural changes that took place before the 
follow-up survey. Employees’ perceptions of their divisions’ positive acceptance of change to ensure the security 
of information assets improved significantly from 80.1% to 85%, as indicated by the t-test results. Employees also 
indicated that the effectiveness of training had improved significantly, from 66.1% to 69.4%. Forty-one of the 55 
statements in the culture section improved significantly according to the results of the t-tests (see the extract in 
table 2 indicated by **). The data indicates that the information security culture became more positive over time. 
One of the reasons for this relates to the comprehensive action plans that were implemented after the as-is 
assessment to address identified developmental aspects. A stronger information security culture relates to an 
improvement of the perception of employees regarding the protection of information. It therefore illustrates an 
improved common understanding of information security and a positive attitude towards the protection of 
information across the organisation. To determine whether information security incidents and breaches were 
lower, the data in an information security breach report could have been reviewed and audit reports could have 
been used in triangulation to support the results. However, such information was regarded as confidential by the 
organisation and therefore could not be shared with the researchers. However, from the survey data, the 
researchers could, for example, establish that employees knew that fewer passwords where shared (as-is survey: 
16.3%; follow-up survey: 13.5%) and that more employees read the information security policy (as-is survey: 
61.1%; follow-up survey: 64.1%). This supports the findings of an improved information security culture based 
on the perceptions of employees. 
 
To further reinforce the change, the participating organisation implemented an annual awareness campaign by 
sending out e-mails and messages on the information security portal in line with developmental aspects identified 
in survey and priority offices. The organisation also conducted quarterly face-to-face discussions in the various 
offices about information security requirements and/or changes.  
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8. Discussion  
Information security officers have to implement information security programmes to protect the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of organisational information. Organisations can use various international 
standards to manage information security in order to protect information. These standards include ISO/IEC 27002 
(ISO/IEC 2013), COBIT (ISACA 2007), The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (SOGP) (ISF 
2007), the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Handbook (NIST 2015) and technical 
standards like those outlined in the PCI DSS requirements and security assessment procedures (Version 3.2) (PCI 
Security Standards Council 2016). However, managing employees’ behaviour and interaction with information in 
the context of information security is a challenge that is not addressed by information security management 
standards. The ISCCM approach can complement these standards by providing an organisation’s management 
with a planned and focused method according to which they can implement a strategy intentionally to achieve 
higher levels of compliance with policies and to mitigate information security incidents related to employees’ 
errors or negligence. This is achieved by focusing on the high-risk or priority employee groups and information 
security concepts identified in the ISCA survey, tailoring and implementing interventions through a phased 
approach to embed change using an approach such as ISCCM.  
 
The ISCCM approach serves as a comprehensive and structured change management approach consisting of 
concrete phases that organisations can apply to redirect and transform their information security culture to a 
desired state.  It could aid in transforming the information security culture in an organisation through a planned 
approach. Whitman and Mattord (2017) argue that information security awareness and training can change 
employee behaviour that hinders the protection of information; however, raising awareness and providing training 
will not be effective if the interventions do not focus on the correct messages and do not target the developmental 
areas. An advantage of the ISCCM approach using ISCA for the as-is phase is that by identifying high-risk groups 
(e.g. certain office locations, job levels or generation groups), resources (e.g. people, time and money) can be 
focused and efforts directed towards implementing specific and tailored interventions, as opposed to investing 
resources on generic awareness programmes targeting the entire workforce. Another benefit of this approach is 
that management can obtain insight (that is not based on assumptions) into employees’ perceptions of information 
security on different levels in the organisation. Benchmarking the results by way of a follow-up survey shows 
management whether the initiatives have been successful and where they should invest in the future to reinforce 
their messages to employees. Instead of only focusing on knowledge creation by raising awareness and offering 
training programmes, management can incorporate initiatives to create a desire to change in employees and to 
equip them thereby embedding the changes in the long term.   
 
The application of the ISCCM approach can have a positive impact on the information security culture in an 
organisation and can have successful change outcomes. The ISCCM approach addresses some limitations of 
existing change management approaches since it incorporates a tactical and operational focus during the 
implementation of the plan and is cost-effective because it is based on a survey. The incorporation of the ISCA 
survey makes the ISCCM relevant to information security because information security perceptions of employees 
are assessed with the aim of transforming the culture. 
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9. Limitations 
 
The discussion of the ISCCM approach in this study includes a quantitative assessment using ISCA for the as-is 
survey in the AI phase following a quantitative approach. Other organisational data or reports and qualitative data 
were not used, but they could be incorporated to validate and complement the as-is survey results of the AI phase 
and the follow-up survey results of the RC phase. This ISCCM approach incorporating the ISCA diagnostic 
instrument has only been implemented in one organisation. It can be expanded to more organisations across 
industries to compare the results regarding the culture change and the impact of transformation.  
10. Conclusion 
 
There is limited work that focuses on formal information security culture change approaches to transform the 
information security culture of organisations to the desired state. In this research, the work of Prosci relating to 
the ADKAR model was integrated with the ISCA diagnostic instrument to propose an information security culture 
change management approach. The statements of the ISCA diagnostic instrument were specifically included to 
inform future research aimed at implementing and improving the approach. The application of this approach was 
illustrated through an empirical study conducted in a financial organisation. 
 
The ISCCM approach was applied to illustrate how interventions are developed on the basis of data obtained 
through the ISCA diagnostic instrument to create a desire among employees to change and to reinforce the change 
with a follow-up survey to monitor the change after the identified actions have been implemented. The overall 
phases of the ISCCM, namely the establishment of the current situation, the transition and the future state, and the 
activities in the ADKAR phases were discussed. The survey data was segmented to identify and prioritise high-
risk demographical groups for interventions to inform the action plans in the ADKAR phases. Certain offices of 
the participating organisation were identified as high-risk areas based on the low mean score on dimensional and 
individual statement levels. The overall mean of the information security culture improved from the one survey 
to the next, with significant improvements on an individual statement level and for the offices. 
 
The ISCCM approach serves as a structured approach that combines elements of ADKAR and ISCA to direct 
efforts to change the information security culture in an organisation in order to minimise incidents related to 
human error or negligence when employees process information. This assists management, for example, in 
developing information security training and awareness programmes that are not based on outdated assumptions, 
but on the as-is situation. It enables management to allocate resources effectively, to prioritise high-risk business 
areas and to monitor the success and impact of interventions. It helps management to implement initiatives 
purposefully from a wider perspective in order to create an aspiration for change and to reinforce the changes 
continuously through a variety of efforts.   
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The ISCCM approach can be improved by incorporating qualitative assessment methods to identify issues in a 
specific context. Further research can focus on applying the ISCCM approach in other industries and testing the 
effectiveness of the approach over time. Changing a culture could take many years, but by applying a structured 
approach such as the ISCCM approach, organisations can purposefully transform their information security 
culture to a desired state where employee behaviour is in line with organisational policies and requirements for 
protecting information.  
 
 
23 
 
Appendix 1: Information security culture change management research 
 
Author Concepts Summary 
 Concept 
of change 
Framework 
or model for 
change 
Quantitative 
as-is 
assessment 
 
Haydon 
(2016) 
Yes No Yes A security culture diagnostic survey to transform the culture in an 
organisation to a desired culture. Lance Haydon published a book that 
focuses on a people-centric approach to transforming the security 
culture of an organisation. He developed a security culture diagnostic 
survey (SCDS) consisting of ten questions to diagnose the current 
culture and proposed a method to analyse and interpret the data with 
the objective of transforming the existing culture to a desired culture. 
Dhillon, Syed 
and Pedron 
(2016) 
 
 
Yes No No An organisational transformation case study. This study examined the 
forming of an information security culture during a merger in a case 
study organisation using interviews. The findings relate to formal, 
information-related and technical changes, among other things, and 
what management should focus on to institutionalise changes. A 
framework for change and an as-is diagnostic instrument was not 
developed as part of the study to gather quantitative data. 
AlHogail 
(2015); 
AlHogail and 
Mirza (2014) 
Yes No Yes An information security culture framework. In this research, AlHogail 
proposes an information security culture framework incorporating 
change management, together with ten focus areas, namely training; 
focus groups; change agents; motivation; milestones and measures; 
involvement; management support; resources; communication; and 
culture assessment. Although an information security culture 
framework was developed, the research does not extend to a 
framework for change. 
Ashenden and 
Sasse (2013) 
Yes No No CISOs as change agents. The researchers propose that Chief 
Information Security Officers act as change agents and understand 
their role to make an impact on the information security culture in 
organisations. The research does not extend to a framework or an as-is 
diagnostic instrument. 
Lacey (2010) Yes No No A discussion of theory. Lacey concentrates on information security 
awareness programmes and how they can be used to change the 
information security culture in organisations. The research does not 
extend to a framework or an as-is diagnostic instrument. 
Van Niekerk 
and Von 
Solms (2005); 
Okere, Van 
Niekerk and 
Carroll (2012) 
Yes Yes No An outcomes-based framework for culture change. The researchers 
incorporate the transformative change steps of Lewin (1951) 
(unfreezing/learning/refreezing) to compile an outcomes framework 
for culture change. The proposed framework incorporates a step where 
an assessment of the current culture is conducted and the ideal future 
state is defined. The gap serves as input to activities to educate 
employees. Finally, metrics are defined to monitor and maintain the 
culture. The as-is diagnostic instrument it not included. 
Ruighaver, 
Maynard and 
Chang (2007) 
Yes No No An information security culture model with a focus on change. The 
researchers apply the model developed by Detert et al (2000) to 
propose an information security culture model that includes a focus on 
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Author Concepts Summary 
 Concept 
of change 
Framework 
or model for 
change 
Quantitative 
as-is 
assessment 
 
change and innovation. The research does not include a change 
management framework or an as-is diagnostic instrument. 
Ngo, Zhou 
and Warren 
(2005) 
Yes Yes No An information security culture transitional model. This research 
proposes a transitional model for an information security culture and 
bases it on the model developed by Bridges (2003). It consists of three 
phases, namely ending (activities to end the old culture), neutral (the 
process of moving to the new culture where requirements are put in 
place) and new beginning zone (reinforcing the new culture) in which 
change activities are grouped. These phases are in line with the work 
of Lewin (1951). The research does not extend to the development of 
an as-is diagnostic instrument. 
Schlienger 
and Teufel 
(2003, 2005) 
Yes No Yes An information security culture questionnaire to measure the as-is 
culture and transition to the desired culture. Schlienger and Teufel 
(2003, 2005) developed a questionnaire focusing on 12 dimensions to 
measure information security cultures. They also developed an online 
tool that employees can use to complete the questionnaire. The tool is 
used to analyse the data in order to implement action plans to 
transform the culture. They validate the questionnaire from an 
academic perspective. The questionnaire is currently available in 
German as a commercial service to the industry (Tree Solution 2018). 
Their initial works incorporate the work of Lewin (1951) 
(unfreezing/learning/ refreezing), but not as part of an information 
security culture change framework or model. 
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Appendix 2: Information Security Culture Assessment (ISCA) diagnostic instrument (questionnaire) 
 
The table below outlines the ISCA statements in column one. The original ISCA dimension names are presented 
in column two and the new dimension names, based on the factor and item analysis, are presented in column three. 
The background questions relate to questions one to 18, and the ISCA information security culture statements 
range from questions 19 to 73, which are listed randomly. For the factor and item analysis results, please refer to 
Da Veiga and Martins (2015b). 
 
 
ISCA statements Original ISCA 
dimensions 
New factor name 
1.  I know what information security is. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
2.  I am aware that X has a written information security policy. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
3.  I have read the information security policy. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
4.  I know where to get a copy of the information security policy. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
5.  I know who the group information security officer is. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
6.  I know who my business unit security officer is. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
7.  I know what my responsibilities are regarding information security. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
8.  I know what an information security incident is. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
9.  I know of an information security breach within my business area within the 
last 12 months. 
Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
10. I have been informed of information security requirements in the last six 
months, e.g. regulations regarding the downloading of e-mail attachments or 
browsing the internet. 
Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
11. I believe that the sharing of passwords should be used to make access to 
information easier. 
Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
12. I am aware of colleagues sharing passwords in my environment. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
13. I understand that some documents are more sensitive than others. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
14. I am aware of a business continuity plan in my business unit. Background questions, 
yes/no scale 
N/A 
15. Which of the following could contain confidential information? 
Please select all that apply: 
Hard copy documents (e.g. printed reports)                                                
Electronic documents 
Faxes 
Business discussions                                                                                  
Telephone conversations 
E-mail 
Voicemail messages 
Documents saved on a PDA (personal digital assistant) or a mobile phone 
Instant messaging conversations 
All the above. 
Background question, 
multiple response scale 
N/A 
16. With whom do you believe you may share your password? Please select all 
that apply 
Helpdesk 
My manager 
No one 
A secretary 
A colleague 
Background question, 
multiple response scale 
N/A 
17. To whom should information security incidents be reported? 
Please select all that apply: 
The helpdesk 
My immediate manager 
Group information security officer 
Human Resources 
IT 
I don’t know 
The whistle-blowing process should be used 
Background question, 
multiple response scale 
N/A 
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ISCA statements Original ISCA 
dimensions 
New factor name 
18. How do you prefer to receive information security messages? 
Please select all that apply: 
Intranet                                                                                                           
Posters 
E-mail 
Discussion groups  
Presentations  
Hands-on training  
SMS messaging 
Web-based training 
Desk drop  
Induction training 
TV or videos  
Booklets 
Background question, 
multiple response scale 
N/A 
19. X’s information security policy is applicable to me during the execution of 
my daily duties.   
Information security 
policies 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
20. Information security must be managed through a formal programme (e.g. 
employees have defined information security roles and responsibilities, 
awareness campaigns). 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
accountability 
21. Executive and senior managers demonstrate commitment to information 
security. 
Information security 
leadership 
Management buy-in  
22. I believe my division is protecting its information assets (e.g. computer 
equipment and documents) adequately. 
Information asset 
management 
Management buy-in  
23. The contents of the information security policy were effectively 
communicated to me. 
User management 
Information security policy 
effectiveness 
24. Our division positively accepts changes in our working practices in order to 
ensure the security of information assets.  
Change management Management buy-in  
25. I believe that third parties who have access to confidential X information 
preserve its confidentiality. 
Trust Not included 
26. The contents of the information security policy are easy to understand. 
Information security 
policies 
Information security policy 
effectiveness 
27. I believe it is necessary to commit time to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
28. Managers in my division appear to adhere to the information security policy. 
Information security 
leadership 
Management buy-in  
29. It is important to understand the threats (e.g. theft of equipment and the 
alteration or misuse of information) to the information assets in my division. 
Information asset 
management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
30. I believe I have a responsibility regarding the protection of X’s information 
assets (e.g. information and computer resources). 
User management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
31. I am informed in a timely manner as to how information security changes 
will affect me. 
Change management 
Information security policy 
effectiveness 
32. I believe that X keeps my private information (e.g. salary or performance 
appraisal information) confidential. 
Trust Management buy-in  
33. I believe the information security policy is practical. 
Information security 
policies 
Information security policy 
effectiveness 
34. I believe it is necessary to commit people to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
35. My colleagues demonstrate commitment to information security. 
Information security 
leadership 
Management buy-in  
36. Information security is necessary in my division. 
Information asset 
management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
37. Information security is primarily a technical issue (it involves predominantly 
the IT division). 
User management Not included 
38. I accept that some inconvenience (e.g. changing my password regularly, 
locking away confidential documents or making back-ups) is necessary to 
secure important information. 
Change management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
39. I believe that X communicates relevant information security requirements to 
me. 
Trust 
Information security policy 
effectiveness 
40. I believe information security requirements should be incorporated in my 
daily duties. 
Information security 
management 
Information security 
accountability 
41. I believe it is necessary to commit money to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
accountability 
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dimensions 
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42. IT employees demonstrate commitment to information security. 
Information security 
leadership 
Information security 
commitment 
43. Information assets in electronic media format (e.g. information saved on my 
hard drive, CDs or a memory stick) need to be protected. 
Information asset 
management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
44. Information assets in paper format/hard copy format (e.g. contracts and 
printed reports) need to be protected. 
Information asset 
management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
45. I am aware of the information security aspects relating to my job function 
(e.g. how to choose a password or handle confidential information). 
User management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
46. I am prepared to change my working practices in order to ensure the security 
of information assets (e.g. computer systems and information in paper or 
electronic format). 
Change management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
47. I believe that X implements information security measures. Trust 
Information security 
commitment 
48. Information security should be part of my performance development 
programme (PDP). 
Information security 
management 
Information security 
accountability 
49. I believe my division commits enough time to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
commitment 
50. Information security is perceived as important by my colleagues. 
Information security 
leadership 
Information security 
commitment 
51. I believe my division will be able to continue its daily operations if there is a 
disaster resulting in the loss of computer systems, people and/or premises. 
Information asset 
management 
Not included 
52. I am aware of the negative consequences of contravening X’s information 
security policy. 
User management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
53. I believe it is necessary for X to monitor compliance with the information 
security policy.   
Information security 
management 
Information security 
necessity and importance 
54. I believe my division commits enough people to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
commitment 
55. Information security is perceived as important by managers. 
Information security 
leadership 
Management buy-in  
56. I believe that the information I work with is protected adequately (e.g. 
access control to buildings and offices, locking away confidential information, 
awareness of what information I give to other people and log-on credentials 
needed for access to computer systems).  
Information asset 
management 
Information security 
commitment 
57. I believe my division commits enough money to information security. 
Information security 
programme 
Information security 
commitment 
58. Information security is perceived as important by executives. 
Information security 
leadership 
Management buy-in  
59. Action (e.g. disciplinary procedure) should be taken against anyone who 
does not adhere to the information security policy (e.g. if they share passwords, 
give out confidential information or visit prohibited internet sites). 
User management 
Information security 
accountability 
60. My division clearly outlines what is expected of me with regard to 
information security. 
Information security 
leadership 
Information security 
commitment 
61. I believe X’s employees adhere to the information security policy. 
Information security 
leadership 
Information security 
commitment 
62. My division encourages adherence to the information security policy. 
Information security 
leadership 
Information security 
commitment 
63. I believe there is a need for additional training to use information security 
controls in order to protect information. 
Training and awareness 
Information security 
accountability 
64. I believe the information security awareness initiatives are effective. Training and awareness 
Information security 
commitment 
65. My colleagues take care when talking about confidential information in 
public places. 
Privacy perception 
Information usage 
perception 
66. X has clear directives on how to protect sensitive/confidential client 
information. 
Privacy perception 
Information security 
commitment 
67. X has clear directives on how to protect sensitive/confidential employee 
information. 
Privacy perception 
Information usage 
perception 
68. I believe that it is important to limit the collection and sharing of sensitive, 
personal information. 
Privacy perception 
Information usage 
perception 
69. I believe X’s client data is complete and accurate. Privacy perception 
Information usage 
perception 
70. My colleagues ensure that client information is protected (e.g. encrypted) 
when taken off site. 
Privacy perception 
Information usage 
perception 
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ISCA statements Original ISCA 
dimensions 
New factor name 
71. I would feel comfortable if X monitored what I posted on social networking 
sites. 
Privacy perception Not included 
72. It is acceptable to me if employees were disciplined if they posted 
inappropriate comments about X on social networking sites. 
Privacy perception Not included 
73. I believe that access to social networking sites will enhance my work 
activities. 
Privacy perception Not included 
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